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Abstract
Prominent IR scholar Kenneth Waltz has acknowledged Christian theologian Reinhold Niebuhr as a 
major influence. Yet Waltz’s neorealist theory of international politics claims to be strictly ‘third image’ 
with no room for ‘first image’ considerations, such as Niebuhr’s emphasis on the explanatory role of ‘sinful’ 
human nature. This article claims that the significance of Niebuhr’s Christian realism for Waltz’s 
neorealism has been profound, much more so than Waltz and IR scholars generally have recognized. 
Three arguments are developed. First, Waltz’s own early attempt to transcend Niebuhrian realism falls 
short. Second, Waltz’s anarchic balance-of-power theory is basically Niebuhrian. Third, Waltz’s 
assumptions about states as egoistic security-seekers can be properly comprehended from Niebuhr’s 
realist theology. As invoking Niebuhr leads to a deeper understanding of Waltz’s theory, Niebuhr 
may be considered the ‘father’ of modern realism, structural as well as classical. 
Keywords: Kenneth Waltz, Reinhold Niebuhr, neorealism, Christian realism, IR 
Article body
Introduction 
Kenneth Waltz’s still prominent neorealist theory of international politics (Booth 2011) holds that the 
international system conditions the behavior of states by generating an interstate competition for security 
that results in a balance of power. Waltz (1979) has deduced this ‘structural’ theory from three central 
propositions. First, as no world government exists, the international realm is a system of constant anarchy, 
albeit one that varies in how capabilities are distributed among its units. Second, the international 
system’s principal units are states, particularly the most capable and powerful ones. Third, states seek to 
safeguard their survival and so have self-security as their primary goal (cf. Kamminga 2010a: 6). Absent 
in Waltz’s neorealism is a claim about human nature. No such assumption is needed, he insists, as 
neorealism treats international politics as a distinct domain for the purpose of theorizing and so is strictly 
‘third image’ (cf. Waltz 1959). By contrast, the older, ‘first image’, ‘classical’ realism of Hans Morgenthau, 
George Kennan, and E.H. Carr did rely on a - pessimistic - view of human nature in the wake of Reinhold 
Niebuhr’s Christian realism. For Waltz (1995), such ‘realist thought’ is valuable yet pseudo-theoretical, in 
contrast to his own ‘neorealist theory’. 
This article asks how we could understand Waltz’s neorealist theory as one that distinguishes itself from 
earlier realist reflection yet purports to stand in the realist tradition.[1] Undoubtedly, whereas Niebuhr and 
Morgenthau were unfamiliar with modern social-scientific methodology (Craig 2003: 132-133), Waltz has 
strengthened IR with a new, Popperian theoretical rigor (cf. Brown 2011: 146; Craig 2003: 120-122). 
However, one may wonder to what extent Waltz’s theory is a realist one, as it seems to lack clear political 
realist intellectual roots. Waltz considers himself ‘a Kantian’ (in Halliday and Rosenberg 1998: 379), which 
suggests a more liberal, idealist or even constructivist outlook (cf. Onuf 2011: 102). Whereas, apart from 
Niebuhr’s influence, the origins of Morgenthau’s realism lie in Max Weber and the realist roots of Carr 
arguably in Thomas Hobbes, typifying Waltz this way may seem impossible indeed (Brown 2011: 153). 
I argue, however, that a Niebuhrian reading will make us recognize Waltz as a realist. Thus, my thesis is 
that Waltz’s neorealism cannot be grasped completely without including the essential impact of Niebuhr’s 
Christian realism.[2] It is not just that, as has been argued recently, for Waltz, too, the ultimate causal 
factor in international politics is human nature (Booth 2011; Crawford 2011; cf. Schuett 2010). It is, more 
specifically, that his neorealism, its theoretical employment of microeconomics notwithstanding, rests on 
Niebuhrian assumptions about human nature as characterized by sin. If my argument will be correct, 
Waltz’s place in the realist tradition as innovator is secured but at a cost: his attempt in Man, the State and 
War (1959) and especially Theory of International Politics (1979) to purge realism from metaphysical, 
theological groundings has failed. Yet the gain then is that the post-9/11 critique that Waltz’s neorealism 
ignores religion can be rebutted. True, Waltz does not treat religion as an explanatory variable and regards 
international politics as a domain based on a separation of politics from religion (Snyder 2011). However, 
he can be said to preserve the very contribution of Niebuhr’s theology as against that of social idealists or 
utopians: to theologically regard politics as an imperfect, necessity-based realm and so to deny it the 
capacity to realize transcendental values (cf. Guilhot 2010). 
Niebuhr’s impact on the realist tradition dates from the publication of his Moral Man and Immoral Society in 
1932 (Thompson 1955; Craig 2003). Although Niebuhr’s concern with theology and morality drew him 
occasionally above and beyond national interest and left the systematic study of interest and power to his 
followers (Thompson 1955: 187), Morgenthau, Kennan - who famously called Niebuhr ‘the father of us all’ - 
and Carr have publicly recognized their intellectual debt to him (Haas 1999: 605). But Waltz has explicitly 
acknowledged Niebuhr’s contribution as well. Seven years after Theory of International Politics was 
published, Waltz wrote:
‘The influence behind my [anti-hegemonic] preference is partly Immanuel Kant and partly Reinhold 
Niebuhr. Kant feared that a world government would stifle liberty, become a terrible despotism, and in the 
end collapse into chaos. Niebuhr drew the conclusion from his dim view of human nature that domestically 
and internationally the ends of security and decency are served better by balanced than by concentrated 
power. I distrust hegemonic power, whoever may wield it, because it is so easily misused’ (Waltz 1986: 
341). 
Both Kant and Niebuhr, then, have inspired Waltz (1979: 111-114) to start his neorealist enterprise by 
rejecting centralized power and celebrating the ‘virtues of anarchy’.[3] Yet, notwithstanding his Kantian-
based critique of inductivism in theory-building (Waltz 1979: 7), Waltz appears most sympathetic to 
Niebuhr. Note that, for Waltz, ‘If there is any distinctively political theory of international politics, balance-
of-power theory is it’ (1979: 117). Kant, however, ‘ridicules the balance of power’ for being utterly fragile, 
as Waltz (1962: 338) himself notes. And in turn, Waltz (1959: 163-165, 182-183; cf. 1962) criticizes 
Kant’s alternative equilibrium - a pacific federation of states - as a ‘futile’ attempt to try escape the war-
proneness of anarchy, as attempting to make states sufficiently perfect to observe a set of laws to which 
they have voluntarily consented will not work without a political system that allows states to behave 
ethically.[4] By contrast, as Waltz states above, Niebuhr is, like himself, relatively positive about balance of 
power. Indeed, Niebuhr saw this as the sine qua non for achieving at least some justice in a sinful world: 
‘there has never been a scheme of justice in history which did not have a balance of power at its 
foundation’ (1940: 104). 
Significantly, both Waltz and Niebuhr have criticized utopianism, pacifism, and perfectionism in politics. 
Both have rejected positivism, empiricism, rationalism, abstract moralism, and progressivism in 
international-political reflection (cf. Guilhot 2010). Both treat international politics as basically different 
from domestic politics, regarding interstate relations as inevitably more conflictual (cf. Niebuhr 1932: 16, 
111; Craig 2003: 36). Moreover, Waltz shares with Niebuhr a German-American Lutheran background (cf. 
Halliday and Rosenberg 1998: 371).[5] Niebuhr was a Lutheran minister and theologian, for whom ‘no 
theologian understood the impossibility of the law of love in a world of sin better than [Luther]’ (1948: 172) 
and who thus came to hold it dangerously utopianist to apply ‘love perfectionism from the gospel’ to the 
political order (cf. 1948: 183, 189). And although Waltz calls himself ‘a lapsed Lutheran’ (quoted in 
Starobin 2006), it makes sense to suspect that his balance-of-power theory could work the way it does 
precisely because of a theological grounding in Niebuhr’s ‘dim view of human nature’ (Waltz). It was a sin-
based view of ‘not so moral man’ (1965: 22, cf. 1932) that made Niebuhr oppose the optimistic Marxists 
and liberals of whom Waltz (1959) later became critical as well.
My case will rest on a threefold argument. First, Waltz’s own early attempt to surpass Niebuhrian realism is 
inconclusive. Second, Waltz’s anarchic balance-of-power theory is basically Niebuhrian. Third, Waltz’s 
assumptions regarding states as egoistic security-seekers can be suitably understood from Niebuhr’s realist 
theology. 
Waltz’s inconclusive attempt to transcend Niebuhrian realism 
Waltz believes that appeals to human nature are pointless in IR, because structure shapes international 
politics much more profoundly than agency does. Thus, he attributes the ‘striking sameness in the quality 
of international life through the millennia’ to the features of the system, the ‘enduring anarchic character of 
international politics’ (Waltz 1979: 66). Nonetheless, my first argument is that Waltz’s effort to surpass 
Niebuhr as a first image thinker is fallacious on its own grounds. 
More than for Morgenthau, Waltz had ‘developed a special fondness for Niebuhr’ as an undergraduate 
student.[6] And in the 1950s, Waltz started his inquiry of international politics by invoking Niebuhr, of 
whom he notes with praise: 
‘Reinhold Niebuhr, a theologian who in the last twenty-five years has written as many words of wisdom on 
problems of international politics as have any of the academic specialists in that subject, has criticized 
utopians, Liberals and Marxist alike, with frequency and telling effect’ (Waltz 1959: 20). 
It can be argued that, for Waltz as a critic of human nature optimism (1959: 39-40, 43, 76), Niebuhr is the 
central first image representative (cf. Kaag and Kreps 2012: 198) - the one to beat as well as to 
appreciate. As Waltz notes, for Niebuhr, ‘Political realism…is impossible without a true insight into man’s 
nature’ (1959: 20). Now as Waltz (1959: 21, 32) observes, Niebuhr’s Christian realism draws on 
Augustine’s conception of original sin. For Niebuhr (1941: 190-255; 1932), then, we must understand the 
evil of human sin in terms of self-pride, inequality, sensuality, and collective egotism. Yet, as Waltz (1959: 
31-33) also recognizes, Niebuhr was convincingly critical politically of Augustine (and Luther), who saw the 
dangers of anarchy in the egotism of citizens but overlooked the dangers of tyranny in the ruler’s 
selfishness and thus the need for checks upon the latter’s will. Earthly perfection being impossible does not 
warrant indifference to the relative qualities of alternative political institutions: (balance of power) 
democracy is more just than totalitarianism (Niebuhr 1954; 1941: 233-234). And although Waltz (1959: 
161-186) appoints Spinoza as spokesman for the first image, Spinoza’s secular psychological conception of 
human nature sits uneasily with Waltz’s own project. Spinoza sees man’s defectiveness - the frequent 
prevalence of passion over reason in pursuing self-preservation - as an empirical datum without 
independent explanation (cf. Waltz 1959: 23-24). But Spinoza thereby ultimately accepts the possibility 
that man progresses far enough (by internal growth or pushed by the state) to be able to let his reason 
control or calm his passions and end war and the need for balance of power. Waltz, then, could not accept 
Spinoza’s human nature view as the key first image one without jeopardizing his own third image mission. 
However, for Waltz, this problem would dissolve if he included Niebuhr’s neo-Augustinian view, one that 
entails an ultimately critical explanation of Spinoza’s dualistic neglect of sin (cf. Waltz 1959: 24):
‘[While believing that] the “Fall” signifies that fact the human reason is unable to control passions 
completely…, Spinoza…manages to express [modern culture’s] confidence in both nature and reason and 
its slight preference for the latter over the former. He fails to understand…that human egotism is 
something more than the natural impulse of every organism “to preserve its own existence”, [and] that it 
has a power which defies both nature and reason’ (Niebuhr 1941: 122-123).  
Yet Jean Bethke Elshtain has a point in noticing that ‘Niebuhr hovers over Waltz’s text but alights, or is 
permitted to alight, nowhere’ (2010: 44). Indeed, Waltz eventually belittles the worth of Niebuhr’s 
theological thought for international-political theorizing: 
‘Niebuhr [1940: 4] writes that “political strategies,” invariably involving “the balancing of power with 
power,” are made necessary by “the sinful character of man.”…[But while h]uman nature may in some 
sense have been the cause of war in 1914,…by the same token it was the cause of peace in 1910. In the 
intervening years many things changed, but human nature did not’ (Waltz 1959: 28). ‘The causes that in 
fact explain differences in behavior must be sought somewhere other than in human nature itself’ (Waltz 
1959: 33). 
However, Waltz’s attempt to bypass Niebuhr’s human nature view this way is flawed. What Waltz (1959, 
1979) wants is to theoretically explain war and other international behavior. While this does not require 
that explanatory factors are strictly political-institutional, it does require the establishment of ‘final’ causes 
of ‘general’ patterns, not of ‘accidental’ causes of ‘particularities’ (Waltz 1959: 231; 1979: 118). Thus, 
when Waltz (1959) asks ‘what are the causes of war?’, it means that he wants to know what explains war 
per se, or the likelihood of war in general. This being so, Waltz’s effort to drive out human nature is 
confused. The inability of human nature to explain the different particularities of 1910 and 1914 does not 
disqualify its potential to ‘finally’ explain war in general. Indeed, in this sense human nature may operate 
similar to the third image cause of anarchy, of which Waltz (1954: 232) remarks that it cannot explain any 
given war but is an indirect, ‘permissive’ cause instead of a ‘direct’ one. If anarchy is alike during war and 
during peace and as a general notion cannot account for historical variance, then it is odd to demand of 
human nature that it could explain particular social events immediately (Waltz 1959: 27-29). In fact, for 
Niebuhr, human nature must not be treated as directly explaining the 1910 (peace) and 1914 (war) 
situations, but as an ultimate war cause: while under different circumstances people behave differently, 
without sinful human nature there would virtually be no war at all.[7] 
Insofar as Waltz is willing to adopt Niebuhr’s emphasis on human nature, he downplays its distinct role 
unduly quickly. He does not dispute that ‘Human nature is a cause…in the sense that if men were 
somehow entirely different, they would not need political control at all’ (Waltz 1959: 28-29). And he 
accepts that ‘Human nature may not explain why…in one year there is war and in another comparative 
peace[, but it] can…explain the necessary imperfections of all social and political forms’ (Waltz 1959: 30). 
However, Waltz then mistakenly takes it for granted that a non-perfect human nature is merely trivial and 
self-evident. He states: ‘Solutions for the problem of war based upon the pattern of either the first or the 
second image [concerning the internal structure of states] must assume the possibility of perfection in the 
conflicting units. [However, p]erfection [is] impossible for states as for men’ (Waltz 1959: 119). And he 
claims: 
‘[W]ithout the imperfections of the separate states there would not be wars, just as it is true that a society 
of perfectly rational beings, or of perfect Christians, would never know violent conflict. These statements 
are, unfortunately, as trivial as they are true…: perfectly good states or men will not do bad things’ (Waltz 
1959: 229). 
But Waltz’s assertion that human and social anti-perfectionism is ‘trivial’ and ‘true’ is wrong, as that is 
both important and worldview-dependent. Waltz himself observes that pacifists, liberals, and ‘revisionist’ 
socialists think otherwise. While liberals tend to stress political reform and revisionists economic and social 
content for solving the war problem, ‘The fundamental assumption is…the same: Each state because it is 
internally so perfect becomes in its external policy so enlightened that conflicts can scarcely ever exist and 
can certainly never lead to violence’ (Waltz 1959: 155-156). However, this ‘fundamental assumption’ 
entails a conviction typical of modern secular thinkers, pacifists, and religious humanists. In the 
terminology of Robert Nelson (1991), we are dealing with representatives of the optimistic ‘Roman’ 
tradition in Western intellectual thought that defends the perfectibility of mankind based on reason and 
enlightened self-interest. According to Nelson, the alternative, more pessimistic ‘Protestant’ tradition, 
which has Augustine as its foundational theologian, is skeptical about such a possibility, as men have 
become too corrupted and sinful to offer a satisfactory foundation for improvement (Nelson 1991: 21, 
64-69). Therefore, Waltz’s rejection of human perfectionism and his belief that it is necessary to include 
the third image of international anarchy is not self-evident at all, but ‘Protestant’ instead of ‘Roman’. And 
given the analysis so far, it is natural to think that the Protestant Niebuhr’s ‘useful’ and ‘valuable warning’ 
of ‘do not expect too much’ from the application of reason to politics (Waltz 1959: 40, 33) has constant 
impact on Waltz’s analysis. Indeed, Waltz’s own fight against ‘expecting too much’ is what makes him 
emphasize the third image of anarchy in a way that reflects Niebuhr’s anti-utopianism as rooted in a denial 
of perfectionism: 
‘According to the third image, there is a constant possibility of war in a world in which there are two or 
more states each seeking to promote a set of interests and having no agency above them upon which they 
can rely for protection. But many liberals and socialist revisionists deny, or at least minimize, the 
possibility that wars would occur in a world of political or social democracies. An understanding of the third 
image makes it clear that the expectation would be justified only if the minimum interest of states in 
preserving themselves became the maximum interest of all of them - and each could rely fully upon the 
steadfast adherence to this definition by all of the others. Stating the condition makes apparent the 
utopian quality of liberal and socialist expectations. The criticism could be extended by questioning as well 
their interpretations of the first image’ (Waltz 1959: 227). 
Here Waltz seems to be employing Niebuhrian insights without acknowledging it. Suspicious as he was of 
liberal and Marxist perfectionism, Niebuhr had criticized the liberal and socialist reliance on (what Waltz 
calls) the ‘second image’. Thus, he argued, the League of Nations was a miserable failure, and a world of 
socialist states would probably prove no less conflictual, as communist governments (he foresaw) would, 
for their own glorification, appeal to national identity and patriotism, not transnational solidarity (Niebuhr 
1932: 90, 96; see Craig 2003: 36). 
One might object that Waltz’s conclusion about the first image does much to minimize the need for a 
Niebuhrian human nature assumption. Thus, he writes: 
‘The assumption of a fixed human nature, in terms of which all else must be understood, itself helps to 
shift attention away from human nature - because human nature, by the terms of the assumption, cannot 
be changed, whereas social-political institutions can be’ (Waltz 1959: 41, emphasis in original). 
Yet Waltz also believes that the political institution of international anarchy cannot, or should not, be 
(basically) changed. He treats international anarchy as invariant but also acknowledges that changing 
anarchy into world government, if ever possible, would not eliminate all wars, as there would be civil wars 
(Waltz 1959: 228). The question then becomes why there is no world government, especially if needed for 
curing world problems, and why would it be so dangerous if it did exist. Possibly, this is because, as Waltz 
himself contends, we cannot trust others (1959: 168, cf. 238; 1979: 103) and that decision-makers are 
fearful calculators who seek to promote a narrowly defined self-interest (1979: 117, 118; 1986: 331; see 
Crawford 2011: 160-163). Thus, Neta Crawford may well be right to think that ‘human nature, for Waltz, 
determines world politics as much or more than the anarchic structure of world politics’ (2011: 160). If so, 
the human nature in question is to be Niebuhrian. 
As Waltz’s early treatment of Niebuhr is inconclusive in itself - Niebuhr remains influentially present in the 
background - there is every reason to look more closely at his later neorealist theory from a Niebuhrian 
perspective. 
Balance of power under anarchy 
Waltz summarizes his neorealist theory by stating: ‘Balance-of-power politics prevail wherever two, and 
only two, requirements are met: that the order be anarchic and that it be populated by units wishing to 
survive’ (1979: 121). Again, Waltz shares Niebuhr’s preference for balanced power as opposed to 
centralized power in politics. Importantly, Waltz (1979: 174; 1986: 329; 1997: 915) has not turned into a 
structural determinist who believes that the international system explains all; his point is that the system 
has significant causal effect. Thus, Waltz’s eventual position leaves room for unit-level explanations and 
even invites us to ask why structure works the strong way it does. From a Niebuhrian perspective, the 
answer would be theological: a non-perfect, sinful human nature entails the metaphysical framework 
within which, subsequently, neorealist theory may become a sensible attempt to explain the international 
institutional ‘shift away’ from human nature. Questioning Waltz’s second requirement of units wishing to 
survive in the next section and taking it as given in the present one, I argue, secondly, that Waltz’s 
balance-of-power theory as requiring anarchy is fundamentally Niebuhrian. 
For Waltz, striving for international hierarchy would be costly and dangerous: 
‘In hierarchic orders,…[s]ubstantive issues become entwined with efforts to influence or control the 
controllers. The hierarchic ordering of politics adds one to the already numerous objects of struggle, and 
the object added is at a new order of magnitude…As hierarchical systems, governments nationally or 
globally are disrupted by the defection of major parts. In a society of states with little coherence, attempts 
at world government would founder on the ability of an emerging central authority to mobilize the 
resources needed to create and maintain the unity of the system by regulating and managing its parts. 
The prospect of world government would be an invitation to prepare for world civil war’ (Waltz 1979: 
111-112). 
Anarchy, for Waltz, is preferable in our non-utopian world and so entails the firm starting-point for 
international theorizing. Yet its drawbacks are serious. Invoking a microeconomic analogy, Waltz (1979: 
105, 115-116) regards international cooperation as strongly constrained. Thus, first, international 
structures limit the cooperation of states rather similar to how oligopolistic markets limit the cooperation of 
firms. Units in both such ‘self-help’ systems will be concerned about their survival and behave accordingly. 
And second, cooperation in international structures is even less probable or sustainable than in oligopolistic 
markets. In the first case units act under anarchy, whereas in the second units operate within 
government-decreed rules. International anarchy makes that states must prepare for their physical 
defense (cf. Kamminga 2010b). 
However, what makes Waltz believe that the international coherence needed to create an ideal hierarchy is 
absent and states under anarchy cannot rely on each other? After all, (neo)liberal theorists tend to be 
more optimistic in this regard. Here Waltz seems to continue his implicit reliance on Niebuhr (for the 
remainder of this paragraph, cf. Amstutz 2008: 120, 129; Kamminga 2011). Niebuhr saw world 
government as illusory, because the shared standards necessary for effective international institutions 
were lacking. Even if world government were desirable, it would be unattainable: governments are not 
created by constitutional fiat, and, more seriously, have only limited efficacy in integrating a community 
rooted in ‘organic’ factors such as a common history (joint struggles against a common enemy), language, 
culture or religion. Also, the shared convictions on issues of justice that political cohesion requires are 
lacking globally (Niebuhr 1954: 24-38, 119, cf. 1952: 136, 1959: 266, 277). Crucially, Niebuhr’s 
pessimism about improving the human condition globally resulted from his observation that sin has even 
more harmful effects in the anarchic international environment than in domestic society. Because of the 
universality of sin, political decisions and actions inevitably include partiality and self-interest. Since sin 
distorts all human enterprises, managing the future is impossible, and all political action immodestly 
directed at grandiose projects is bound to fail (Niebuhr 1952: 72; 1959: 287-299). Waltz’s anarchy 
preference and remaining pessimism are comprehensible precisely because of these Niebuhrian notions. 
Given anarchy, balance-of-power theory is the hallmark of Waltz’s approach. Now neorealism does not 
claim to explain a continuous presence of balance of power, like how microeconomic theory does not 
envisage a system to be in equilibrium normally. ‘Economic theory expects strong and persistent 
tendencies, rather than particular states or conditions. Similarly, [neorealism holds] that international-
political systems tend strongly toward balance but are seldom in balance’ (Waltz 1997: 914-915, 
emphases in original). Even if it were empirically true that states seek ever more power instead of 
regarding power as 
a means and survival as a goal, and bandwagoning (weaker states joining a strong power) is more 
common than balancing, neorealist theory would not fail, Waltz (1997: 915; cf. 1979: 116-123, 126) 
insists, as it represents a unique research paradigm. 
However, if indeed Waltz allows bandwagoning to factually occur more often than balancing, it is natural to 
ask why he holds on to his specific research paradigm. One might think that Waltz holds on to his theory 
‘religiously’: by ‘moving the goalposts’ (cf. Guzzini 1998: 126) in cases of counter-evidence. But we should 
recall Waltz’s distrust of hegemonic power, no matter who employs it, as that, he thinks, is so easily 
abused. For Waltz, then, balanced power is preferable to even a ‘benevolent’ dominant power: 
‘In the light of structural theory, unipolarity appears as the least stable of international configurations. 
Unlikely though it is, a dominant power may behave with moderation, restraint, and forbearance. Even if it 
does, however, weaker states will worry about its future behavior. America’s founding fathers warned 
against the perils of power in the absence of checks and balances. Is unbalanced power less of a danger in 
international than in national politics?…Unbalanced power, whoever wields it, is a potential danger to 
others. The powerful state may, and the United States does, think of itself as acting for the sake of peace, 
justice, and well-being in the world. These terms, however, will be defined to the liking of the powerful, 
which may conflict with the preferences and interests of others. The powerful state will at times act in 
ways that appear arbitrary and high handed to others, who will smart under the unfair treatment they 
believe they are receiving’ (Waltz 1997: 915-916). ‘Ideally, a benevolent despot is able to fashion the wise 
policies that the compromises of democracy impede. Similarly, imperial countries, superior to those they 
rule, may claim to aim at uplifting the natives but seldom produce that result. Disparity of power spawns 
despotic rule at home and abroad. Through the long years of the Cold War the might of each superpower 
balanced the might of the other and moderated the behavior of both of them…The disappearance of…
balance unleashed the impulses of the remaining great power. Superiority fosters the desire to use 
it’ (Waltz 2004: 4-5).
Again, Waltz’s analysis about the typical instability of unipolarity begs important questions. Why is it so 
unlikely that a benevolent power acts with restraint? Why should weaker states fear a great power that 
aims to be benevolent and even acts as such? Why should we prefer an international politics of checks and 
balances if a benevolent despot could do more good ideally (cf. Etzioni 2004)? Why would superiority 
promote the desire to use power? Apparently, Waltz tacitly rejects more liberal perspectives because of a 
typically Niebuhr Ian suspicion of the motives and methods of great powers as potential international 
stabilizers (Niebuhr 1940; cf. Kaag and Kreps 2012: 198), fear of American imperialism, and defense of 
both domestic democracy and international balance of power in terms of checks and balances. For Niebuhr 
(1944), not an enthusiastic liberalism but a cautious yet hopeful Christian anthropology should ground 
democratic government (Amstutz 2008: 135; cf. Kamminga 2011). And he warned Americans for the 
conviction that their values and ideas are universal and their nation serves providentially assigned 
purposes (Bacevich 2008: 7). If, because of man’s sin, people of both good and malign intent invariably 
take advantage of those in weaker positions, the obvious solution is to minimize power disparities among 
both individuals and groups. Thus, Niebuhr wrote: ‘All political justice is achieved by coercing the anarchy 
of collective self-interest into some kind of decent order by the most attainable balance of power’ (1940: 
104). For Waltz as well as for Niebuhr, without such power equilibrium the needs of weaker parties are 
unlikely to be addressed. In Niebuhr’s explanation, they will not be so because the finitude of man 
prevents him from understanding the needs of his neighbor as well as his own, and even more 
importantly, because the sin of man impels him to prefer, both consciously and unconsciously, the 
fulfillment of his own interests more than those of his neighbors (see Haas 1999: 617-618). Thus, Niebuhr 
argued that international order requires the maintenance of interstate balance of power because of the 
universal impact of sin (Amstutz 2008: 120). Ultimately, Waltz’s balanced power preference relies on such 
Niebuhrian insights that rest on a Christian, ‘dim view of human nature’ (Waltz): ‘the facts about human 
nature which make a monopoly of power dangerous and a balance of power desirable are understood in 
neither [classical economic theory nor Marxist secular] theory but are understood from the standpoint of 
the Christian faith’ (Niebuhr 1954: 99). 
Thus, as regards his neorealist theory of balance of power, Waltz settles for this second best solution - no 
‘ideal’ world government (needed for true progress) but a ‘real’ balance of power - ultimately because of a 
Niebuhrian non-perfectionist view of human nature (to be spelled out more deeply in the next section). In 
Waltz’s theory, it is the latter that makes an ideal world government undesirable as well as infeasible and a 
benevolent hegemon undesirable at least. 
States as egoistic security-seekers 
Waltz regards the anarchic international domain as being populated by units who wish to survive. Like any 
structural theory, Waltz’s neorealism must make assumptions about what motivates its major units. It 
makes two: (i) states are concerned first and foremost with security, since the pursuit of other goals only 
makes sense once survival is assured; (ii) states are egoistic or self-regarding (Waltz 1979: 126, 91; cf. 
Wendt 1999: 99-100). Third, then, I argue that Waltz’s assumptions about states as egoistic security-
seekers can be properly understood from Niebuhr’s realist theology. 
Waltz (1979: 93-95, 131-134) argues empirically as well as deductively - by analogy with microeconomic 
theory - why states, especially the stronger ones, are to be taken as the system’s major units. First, states 
have long been the major international actors and so define the international structure. Second, the 
international structure resembles a situation of oligopoly rather than perfect competition, as it is 
dominated by a limited number of states rather than many roughly equal states. Third, practically, states 
set the scene in which all actors, multinationals included, must operate, the terms of the relations between 
them and non-state actors, and even the rules other actors have to accept. As even weak states have 
often been able to hold international corporations under control, non-state actors do not appear to develop 
to the point of challenging the great powers. Fourth, while many firms perish, states die rarely (cf. 
Kamminga 2010b). 
Waltz (1979: 91-92, 98, cf. 118, 133-134, 1997: 915) defends the state security egoism assumptions 
along these lines. First, a micro-theory, economic or international-political, assumes, rather than 
realistically describes, the motivation of actors. To assume that states aim to safeguard their survival - and 
thus need, first and foremost, to have their security ascertained - is to make a major simplification for 
enabling theory construction. Second, this assumption is useful, as it is possible to build a theory based on 
it that may generate new and important insights. Third, this assumption is sensible, because survival is a 
prerequisite for realizing any goals that states may have, particularly in a world where the security of 
states is uncertain. Fourth, states are self-regarding about their security, because under self-help 
conditions they cannot depend for this on other states (cf. Kamminga 2010b). Importantly, states operate 
as ‘like units’ in this sense (Waltz 1979: 93). 
However, Waltz’s defense is inconclusive. First, he relies heavily on empirical analysis for selecting states 
as the main actors, which makes for a rather insecure foundation. Second, his argument for assuming 
states to seek survival as simple, useful, and reasonable is rather circular. Stating that this assumption 
serves the purpose of good theory-building under anarchy entails no sufficiently independent defense. 
Third, the economic analogy appears not to hold adequately. Waltz suggests that states are like rational 
firms in economic theory, yet - unlike most modern realists and many (neo)liberals - harbors reservations 
about the rationality assumption. He insists that ‘[balance-of-power] theory requires no assumptions of 
rationality…on the part of all the actors’, instead stressing the role of ‘fear’ of failing to prosper, laying 
oneself open to dangers, suffering (Waltz 1979: 118).[8] Fourth, as Alexander Wendt (1999: 105, 103) 
argues, Waltz does not clarify that his conclusions about the effects of anarchy and power distribution also 
depend on his motivational assumptions: the explanatory work is not done completely by the structural 
factors. 
What, then, makes Waltz believe that (capable) states are the major actors and generally operate as 
egoistic security-seekers? Again, Niebuhr’s Christian realism seems to underpin Waltz’s position. As we 
shall see, the empirical reliance problem involved in the choice for states can be reduced by recognizing 
the theological, sin-based inheritance; and also the circularity embedded in the security egoism 
assumption can be removed by including the concept of original sin. Thus, I argue that Waltz’s neorealism 
assumes that states, whatever their ideological or cultural make-up, are like egoistic collectivities in the 
sense of Niebuhr, protecting ‘immoral societies’ based on national egoism and fear for security resulting 
from a ‘not so moral man’ human nature. Neorealism modifies the microeconomic analogy by implicitly 
accepting a Niebuhrian distinction between the economic or profit motive as the key to the mystery of 
human incentives and other motives such as those for security and power (Niebuhr 1954: 87). While 
motivational assumptions are variable (Wendt 1999: 104-107), Waltz’s rejection of the more altruistic 
assumptions constructivists are willing to include arguably goes back to Niebuhr. 
Niebuhr insisted that a realistic theory must include groups - notably states - as distinguishable from, 
albeit ultimately reducible to, sinful individual humans. Individuals can be unselfish, but groups (states) 
cannot; they effectively magnify individuals’ egoistic urges: 
‘In every human group there is less reason to guide and to check impulse, less capacity for self-
transcendence, less ability to comprehend the needs of others, therefore more unrestrained egoism than 
the individuals, who compose the group, reveal in their personal relationships’ (Niebuhr 1932: xi). ‘[G]roup 
pride is…merely an aspect of the pride and arrogance of individuals [yet] achieves a certain authority over 
the individual… [F]urthermore,…the pretensions and claims of a collective…self exceed those of the 
individual ego. The group is more arrogant, hypocritical, self-centred and more ruthless in the pursuit of its 
ends than the individual…[Group] egotism…is most consistently expressed by the national state, because 
the state gives the collective impulses of the nation such instruments of power, and presents the 
imagination of individuals with such obvious symbols of its discrete collective identity, that the national 
state is most able to make absolute claims for itself, to enforce those claims by power and to give them 
plausibility and credibility by the majesty and panoply of its apparatus…Sinful pride and idolatrous 
pretension are…an inevitable concomitant of the cohesion of large political groups’ (Niebuhr 1941: 
221-223). 
Niebuhr’s understanding of collective egoism takes the national interest as realistic albeit ethically dubious. 
Niebuhr (1932: 48), then, saw the nation as the ultimate community of loyalty - as smaller units lack the 
size and larger units the concreteness and durability to command man’s highest loyalty - although he 
resisted national glorification. This universal view of the nation as the pre-eminent selfish community 
(Niebuhr 1932: 88) is grounded in the Christian conception of sin: ‘Collective pride[: the] very essence of 
human sin is in it…[C]ollective egotism and group pride are a more pregnant source of injustice and 
conflict than purely individual pride’ (Niebuhr 1941: 226). Niebuhr adds that (Christian) love cannot cure 
sin in an environment of collectivities (cf. Waltz 1959: 26): 
‘Only a forgiving love, grounded in repentance, is adequate to heal the animosities between nations. But 
that degree of love is an impossibility for nations. It is a very rare achievement among individuals; and the 
mind and heart of collective man is notoriously less imaginative than that of the individual’ (Niebuhr 1948: 
139; cf. 1954: 127-130). 
Furthermore, Waltz’s doubts about rationality or altruism as typical of the motivation of (powerful) states 
reflect Niebuhr’s critique of utopians: 
‘The moralists…who imagine that the egoism of individuals is being progressively checked by the 
development of rationality or the growth of a religiously inspired goodwill[, fail] to recognize those 
elements in man’s collective behavior which belong to the order of nature and can never be brought 
completely under the dominion of reason or conscience’ (Niebuhr 1932: xii). ‘[Utopians] do not see that 
the limitations of the human imagination, the easy subservience of reason to prejudice and passion, and 
the consequent persistence of irrational egoism, particularly in group behavior, make social conflict an 
inevitability in human history, probably to its very end’ (Niebuhr 1932: xx). ‘The relations between 
groups…will be determined by the proportion of power which each group possesses at least as much as by 
any rational and moral appraisal of the comparative needs and claims of each group’ (Niebuhr 1932: xxiii). 
Thus, Waltz’s theoretical journey toward the third image includes the belief that states are dominant and 
like units because of a hidden Niebuhrian foundation: as the strongest collectivities, states are similarly 
egoist and self-serving (Craig 2003: 35), thus insecure, and therefore strive for survival instinctively 
(Niebuhr 1932: 18). ‘The theory makes assumptions about the interests and motives of states, rather than 
explaining them’, Waltz (1979: 112) says rather conveniently. But it is Niebuhrian theology that finally 
completes the ‘usefulness’ and ‘sensibleness’ of these assumptions by offering the required independent 
justification. Most importantly, Niebuhr explains why, for Waltz, states are the strongest form of egoistic 
groups with the impulse to self-preservation under anarchy. The demand of religious moralists that nations 
obey ‘the law of Christ’ is unrealistic and the hope that they will do so sentimental (Niebuhr 1932: 75). 
This is where Waltz’s domain of international politics really begins: by assuming ‘immoral’ states. 
Next, Niebuhr explains that below these immoral states there is ‘not so moral’ man. Even the morality of 
those individuals possessing the highest degree of Christian goodwill is normally limited to the egoistic 
nation-state and so non-cosmopolitan in scope, as pure transnational benevolence is impossible in a sinful 
world. Even a nation composed of individuals with the highest degree of religious goodwill would be less 
than loving in its relation to other nations, if only because the individuals could not think themselves into 
the position of the individuals of another nation in a degree sufficient to insure pure benevolence. 
Furthermore, the goodwill they did possess would be channeled into loyalty to their own nation and 
strengthen that nation’s selfishness (Niebuhr 1932: 75). Consequently, Niebuhr argues: 
‘The unqualified character of [loyalty to the nation] is the very basis of the nation’s power and of the 
freedom to use the power without moral restraint. Thus the unselfishness of individuals makes for the 
selfishness of nations…Altruistic passion is sluiced into the reservoirs of nationalism with great ease, and is 
made to flow beyond them with great difficulty. What lies beyond the nation, the community of mankind, 
is too vague to inspire devotion’ (Niebuhr 1932: 91). ‘[T]he nation is at one and the same time a check 
upon, and a final vent for, the expression of individual egoism…A combination of unselfishness and 
vicarious selfishness in the individual thus gives a tremendous force to national egoism, which neither 
religious nor rational idealism can ever completely check’ (Niebuhr 1932: 93-94). 
When, then, Niebuhr writes that ‘The selfishness of nations is proverbial’ and ‘an inevitability’ (1932: 84, 
272), this is to be explained by the limits as well as the possibilities of human benevolence. While the 
national self is more than the sum of its individual selves, sinful human nature is the ultimate key (cf. 
Niebuhr 1932: 88). Waltz’s neorealist world aims to be realistic because of Niebuhrian individual as well as 
collective factors. Indeed, Waltz’s claim that state security egoism is to stay relies on a factor deeper than 
mere anarchy: ‘the ultimate sources of social conflicts and injustices are to be found in the ignorance and 
selfishness of men’ (Niebuhr 1932: 23), and ‘The will-to-power of competing national groups is the cause 
of the international anarchy which the moral sense of mankind has thus far vainly striven to overcome’ 
(1932: 18-19). In adopting egoistic assumptions instead of more altruistic ones (cf. Wendt 1999), such is 
what Waltz presupposes about his units. 
Conclusion 
Politically, Waltz’s neorealist theory locates the primary causes of war and balance of power at the third 
image level of international anarchy. Yet Waltz’s anarchy problem is embedded in a first image Niebuhrian 
view of the sinful nature of man, which expresses itself most forcefully in state-level collectivities where it 
cannot (even) be healed by love as the ultimate Christian command and norm. Whereas Waltz insists that 
theory is to be built ‘creatively’ from a ‘brilliant intuition’ or ‘creative idea’ (1979: 9), and so is ‘artifice’ 
(1995: 68), the doctrine of original sin entails the foundational ‘creative’ assumption for his neorealism to 
work. ‘Original sin’ cannot claim conclusive proof - although Niebuhr (cf. 1965: 24) suggested strong 
empirical evidence for this ‘obvious fact’ (1952: 17) - but it should be no problem for Waltz to ‘see’ a sin-
constituted human nature without being able to prove its existence. Presuming its presence gives him the 
ultimate explanation of international-political action (cf. Hollis and Smith 1990: 207). That is roughly how 
Niebuhr himself used this Christian doctrine that was univocally rejected by practically all different schools 
of modern culture (Niebuhr 1952: 17). Thus, Waltz’s (1979) ‘creative’ application of neoclassical firm 
theory to international politics is arguably filtered through Niebuhr’s ‘creative’ use of the Christian sin 
concept. 
That the pessimistic outlook of Waltz’s neorealism ultimately rests on a Niebuhrian, ‘Protestant’ human 
nature view explains why his employment of neoclassical (liberal) economic theory has not led to a more 
optimistic, more (neo)liberal theory of international politics (cf. Kaag and Kreps 2012: 198-199). Arguably, 
modern, Enlightenment-based neoclassical economic thought has its roots in Nelson’s ‘Roman’ tradition, 
particularly because of its notion of universal harmony (welfare or common good) from the forces of self-
interest through Adam Smith’s hidden hand (Nelson 1991). By contrast, for Niebuhr (1954: 114-139), the 
ultimate cause of humanity’s problems is not mere egoism, but, as Augustine taught, the universal and 
permanent presence of original sin. Accordingly, neorealism highlights balance of power, not harmony. In 
constructivist terms, Waltz’s ‘logic of anarchy’ represents a ‘Niebuhrian culture’, rather than, as Wendt 
(1999: 284-285) believes, a ‘Lockean culture’. After all, the latter ‘culture’ is broadly Roman rather than 
Protestant because of the Lockean emphasis on rationalism, optimism, and progressivism, without seeing 
reason as corrupted and undermined by the sinful state of mankind (John Locke’s own Protestant, Puritan 
upbringing notwithstanding; Nelson 1991: 20, 31, 90-95, 123, 131, 194). 
With Waltz having never abandoned Niebuhr truly, the traditional textbook divide between classical realism 
and neorealism is smaller than normally assumed: a human nature assumption remains crucial. Indeed, 
religion has never left modern IR entirely, as Niebuhr provides the theological key to neorealism as its 
dominant theory. In economics, the optimistic, rationalistic, Roman tradition has been much more 
influential than the pessimistic, skeptical, Protestant one (Nelson 1991). By contrast, Waltz’s appeal to 
microeconomic theory notwithstanding, with the domination of (neo)realism and Niebuhr as the ‘father’ of 
modern realism, in IR the Protestant tradition has been most influential. The argumentative structure of 
Waltz’s neorealism is microeconomic, but its political substance is basically Niebuhrian. This article, then, 
has confirmed a Niebuhrian insight denied by Waltz: ‘an understanding of political phenomena, whether 
international or domestic, is inseparable from a clear picture of human nature’ (Thompson 1955: 172). 
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Notes 
[1] My thanks to Simon Polinder for his helpful comments.
[2] Like Waltz, I leave aside the later Niebuhr who during the 1950s softened his realism by morally 
defending U.S. statecraft beyond national egoism (cf. Niebuhr 1952, 1958; Bacevich 2008) and by -
vaguely and uneasily - considering a world state because of the thermonuclear threat (see Craig 2003; 
Niebuhr 1959). Also, I shall not discuss Niebuhr’s occasionally specific, easily reversible political 
judgments, of which Waltz (1959: 31-32) is rightly critical.
[3] Robert Schuett (2010) has offered a remarkable Freudian-psychological reconstruction of the human 
nature assumptions underlying both classical realism and post-classical realism, notably the structural 
realist theories of Waltz and John Mearsheimer. Of course, I agree with Schuett that Waltz’s neorealism is 
deeply infused with human nature assumptions, and also that Waltz should not be seen as an Augustinian 
or Niebuhrian without extensive analysis (cf. Schuett 2010: 8). Yet I would argue that Schuett’s argument 
for Waltz’s - conscious or unconscious - employment of Freud is much more speculative than my argument 
for the Niebuhrian nature of Waltz’s neorealism. Thus, first, Waltz has never explicitly acknowledged Freud 
as a major influence - in contrast to Niebuhr - and, as Schuett (2010: 69) concedes, has rarely cited the 
latter. Second, Schuett (2010: 69-72) himself states that a more direct and deep intellectual relationship 
between Freud and Waltz cannot be established, rather than some occasional ‘points of contact’. On the 
other hand, it is worthwhile to note that, by invoking Freud (who preached a deep human alienation), 
Schuett, like the present author, appears inclined to place Waltz in the ‘Protestant’ tradition within Western 
intellectual thought (see Nelson 1991: 21, 49, 150-161 and the text below).
[4] A Kantian reading of Waltz’s neorealism may suggest deep similarities between Kant and Waltz’s views 
on the nature of systemic approaches to the field but also reveal the critically different conclusions they 
reach about the nature of the international system (Harrison 2002).
[5] Kant’s background was German Lutheran. 
[6] Waltz said this during the close of the 2008 Waltz Conference at Aberystwyth University. See
http://www.aber.ac.uk/en/interpol/news-and-events/videocasts/waltzconference2008.
[7] Waltz (1959: 231-232) also tends to blur the distinction between ‘irrationalities in men’ (note the use of 
the plural) as ‘accidental’ or ‘immediate’ war causes within the first image and human nature as a general 
first image cause. By suddenly dealing with the latter in terms of the former, he lets the potentially 
independent contribution of human nature disappear by a sleight of hand. But it can be simultaneously true 
that some accidental irrationality is the cause of a particular war and that human nature is a fundamental 
cause of war in general - perhaps one that, as Niebuhr would hold, underpins not only accidental causes 
but even the permissive cause of the state of anarchy attached to a nation-state system.
[8] ‘I don’t like the word rationality, I’ll admit it’, Waltz said at the 2008 Aberystwyth conference (note 6). 
See also Mearsheimer (2009: 241), who as a neorealist castigates Waltz for rejecting the rational actor 
assumption. 
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